Napoleon's return: the battle that never was

Background

In the aftermath of the battle of the Nile, Nelson was left in Egypt with his army, attempting but failing to find an overland route back to Europe thanks to the successful defence of Acre by the Turks, aided by a British squadron under Sir Sydney Smith.
By April 1799, the British Mediterranean fleet, of 30 ships of the line in all, was widely dispersed. St Vincent, the overall commander, had Nelson commanding in the eastern Mediterranean, Keith commanding the blockading squadron off Cadiz, and had retained the west for himself. Nelson had one ship at Palermo, two at Acre with Smith, four with Troubridge off Naples, and three with Ball off Malta. Keith has sixteen blockading Cadiz, and St Vincent four with Duckworth at newly taken Port Mahon.
At the same time, the French had 25 of the line at Brest, and the two escapees from the Aboukir Bay fleet, now blockaded in Malta. Spain had five in harbour at Ferrol, and seventeen in Cadiz, a potential total of 49 could they all be assembled. The basis for a decisive battle existed.
Manoeuvring started with orders to Admiral Bruix to leave Brest, pick up the five Spanish ships from Ferrol, and after relieving the blockade, the seventeen from Cadiz, and enter the Mediterranean with the aim of picking up troops in Italy, sailing to relieve Malta and Egypt, and to defeat the British Fleet. Elaborate smokescreens were laid to hide the intentions: rumours were spread that the fleet was sailing to Ireland, where an actual uprising was taking place, the remaining Dutch ships at the Helder were made ready for sea, and troops were moved to Holland.
Not surprisingly, Bruix easily evaded Lord Bridport, commanding the Brest blockade, and sailed south. The plan started to go wrong when a westerly gale prevented the Spanish ships leaving harbour, blockade or not, but by the first week in May he had passed Gibraltar (seen, though in poor visibility, by the British). He could have headed east, and with luck encountered and taken the various separarte British detachments one by one, but instead headed for Toulon.
This gave St Vincent a chance to concentrate some force against him. He sent warnings to Nelson, and ordered Keith to raise the Cadiz blockade for Gibraltar, after which he sailed to Minorca to add Duckworth's squadron. The western section of the fleet was now concentrated, but on the other hand the Spanish were out of Cadiz: the fleet from there (which included six three-deckers) passed through the Strait on May 17 and reached Carthagena, though encountering a gale meant that two of their ships collided and ten more lost one or more masts.
Almost counterbalancing the release of the Spanish from Cadiz, Bruix's escape from Brest meant there was no immediate need to blockade it: twelve ships from the Channel Fleet under Rear-Admiral Cotton were therefore detached to reinforce in the Mediterranean. There were now 32 British ships off Minorca, poised between the seventeen Spaniards, not all of them fit for sea, in Carthagena and the 25 French in Toulon.
At this point St. Vincent fell ill, and on June 16th resigned his command, handing over to Keith. And then it all fizzled out.
Bruix was ordered to sail from Toulon to Alexandria, embark Napoleon's army, and bring it back to Toulon. Realising that the concentrated British force probably now outnumbered him, he sailed first for Carthagena for Spanish reinforcements. But the Spaniards refused to sail, at least to Egypt: they only offered to sail with him back to Brest via Cadiz. And this they did, with Keith in vain pursuit. By August 13th everything was more or less back where it had been in April.
Except that with all this going on, Napoleon had sailed from Alexandria in the frigate Muiron (with Rear-Admiral Ganteaume) and Murat and his other main generals in the frigate Carrère (Commodore Dumanoir).

Aftermath

In many ways the battle or battles that never took place represented a missed opportunity for glory for the French: even without the Spaniards, Bruix's fleet that first sailed into the Mediterranean heavily outnumbered anything the British had in one place in the East. He should have had no trouble chasing them off from Malta and dealing with Smith's tiny squadron off Palestine. Even if Nelson had managed to add Troubridge's four and Ball's three to his own Vanguard , he could hardly have stood up to Bruix's 25.
Alternatively, had he been more aggressive in the west he could have at least severely damaged Keith off Cadiz, and on the way to Toulon could profitably have engaged Duckworth at Minorca, leaving him less dependent on Spanish help in handling the best St. Vincent or Keith could assemble.
With Spanish help, he would of course have been in a much stronger position still: there is no reason why he could not have driven the British back out of the Mediterranean again, and with lines of communication re-established, the army in Egypt would no longer have been marooned, and the operation that was shortly to defeat them could not have taken place.
Britain had to be grateful that Bruix was no Nelson or St. Vincent - or even a Keith or a Duncan.